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How the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act Works
by Paul F. Rothstein
The Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act, approved
by the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates, has been submitted to state legislatures.
This timely act seeks recompense for the victims
of crimes, but also incorporates numerous
safeguards to prevenf abuse.
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION's House of
Delegates, meeting in Houston on February 5, 1974,
approved an idea whose time is rapidly approaching-
the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act. The act is
the product of a committee of the National Conference
ol Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for which I
served as consultant and reporter over its three years
of deliberations. The conference approved the act in
1973 and recommends adoption in all states.
The act establishes a state-financed program of rep-
arations to persons who suffer personal injury, and to
dependents of persons killed, as the result of certain
criminal conduct or attempts to prevent criminal con-
duct or apprehend the perpetrators. A specially con-
stituted board determines, independent of any court
adiudication, the existence of a crime, the damages
caused, and the other requisites for reparations, except
that a final conviction determines that a crime has oc-
curred. "Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard
used. Reparations cover economic loss-medical ex-
penses, rehabilitative and occupational retraining ex-
penses, loss of earnings, and the cost of actual substitute
services.
Justification for such an act is variously stated. Some
persons say the state owes this to victims, having in-
duced citizens to lay down their own arms in reliance
on state protection and then having failed to prevent
crime. Others urge parity between the expensive concern
society lavishes on offenders-constitutional safeguards,
free counsel, prison accommodations-and the concern
shown their victims. This disparity often is enormous-
private rights of recovery are largely illusory, offenders
being untraceable or impecunious.
Probably the principal explanation for the burgeoning
interest in this kind of act is simple humanitarianism-a
recognition that we all share an interest in the well-being
of our neighbors and an increasing willingness to distrib-
ute the cost of catastrophe.
Similar programs already exist in fifteen foreign com-
mon law jurisdictions, beginning with New Zealand in
1963 and Great Britain in 1964, and spreading to
several provinces of Canada, Australia, and Ireland.
Twelve of our states have joined them, including Alaska,
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island
(tentatively), and Washington. The United States Senate
in 1973 passed S. 300, covering federally governed
locales and providing for a 75 per cent federal financing
of state programs complying with federal standards.
Prospects for eventual House passage seem good.
Some of the positions taken by the uniform act on a
number of important issues dividing the field of criminal
injuries compensation follow.
Should Compensation Depend on Financial Need?
Should criminal injuries compensation be a welfare
measure, allowed only to the extent the crime creates
severe financial hardship? Several plans, notably those
of New York and Maryland, provide so. The uniform
act recommends against any approach that considers
financial ability. Since some states may disagree, the
act provides an optional financial means test, which
rejects linking compensation to "needs," "poverty," or
"financial hardship," and adopts instead the somewhat
innovative concept of "financial stress." This seeks to
prevent too great an impact on a claimant's customary
way of life, whether rich, poor, or middle class. "Finan-
cial stress" is a refinement of an idea found in the fed-
eral proposal and draws heavily on the New York Crim-
inal Injuries Compensation Board's seven years of
experience under a stricter standard.
The drafters note that a financial ability provision is
not all savings: it entails administrative costs in de-
termining eligibility. The act allocates the burden of
economizing to other provisions, such as those limiting
the elements of comoensable damage and placing amount
limits on awards. There is, for example, an upward ceil-
ing of $50,000 a victim (not per claimant), an optional
$100 minimum that losses must exceed to be, compensa-
ble (does the expense of investigation of eligibility
exceed any savings?), a $200 a week lost income limit,
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and a $500 limit on funeral and related expenses. Lost
services not actually replaced for a cost are excluded.
Medical and other similar expenses are confined to semi-
private accommodations and reasonable, customary, and
necessary charges.
Should Pain and Suffering Be Compensable?
The uniform act, like most others, does not compen-
sate "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impair-
ment, and other nonpecuniary loss." This should allow
more people to be at least partly compensated although
it can be extremely harsh on the unemployed housewife,
for instance, who has lost an eye or arm but still man-
ages to do her housework and whose insurance absorbs
her medical costs. Despite real damage, she receives
nothing. But a crime victim's reparation act does not
affect private rights the claimant may have against the of-
fender. Fhus, the claimant is not being deprived of
existing entitlements to damages for pain and suffering,
as is the case under no-fault insurance.
Should Property Damage Be Included?
In accord with most existing programs, property
damage is excluded. Limited resources can embrace
only the most compelling injuries. Property losses could
rapidly deplete resources. Besides, private insurance is
often available. The act rejects the distinction made by
the federal bill between "victims" and "good Samari-
tans." The latter and their surviving families are en-
couraged by being entitled to property reparations.
Should a Board or a Court Administer the Plan?
Existing programs use a board or a court to ad-
minister the plan. Some use the workmen's compensa-
tion board. Like most programs, the uniform act believes
that the number of cases and questions peculiar to this
area justify a special board rather than a workmen's
compensation board or a court.
Should the Board Function like a Court?
A more formal judicial model was adopted even
though a less formal approach is economical of time
and resources, because the rights dispensed seem as
fundamental and important as any others. Claimants are
entitled to lawyers, transcripts, detailed notice, and dis-
covery, with special provisions governing the waiver of
medical privilege and granting the board subpoena
powers. Attorneys' fees are, board awarded over and
above compensation. Larger fees are illegal. The state
attorney general is notified and may intervene on either
side. A full record is kept, and decisions must be based
on evidence in the! record, with written findings of fact
and law and judicial review. Interested parties have
ample opportunity to confront the evidence and examine
the record. Decisions and rules or policies bearing on
decisions are made public. Rule making is exempted
from the public notice and challenge process of state
administrative procedure acts because of the lack of
demonstrable effect on identifiable interests and parties.
How About Payments from "Collateral Sources"?
A program which stretches limited state dollars re-
quires that some deduction from the state award (or
some reimbursement to the state) be made for other
payments reccived by the claimant for the same injury.
Whether the state should be credited only when the
sum from these collateral sources is for elements of
damage recognized in the compensation award has been
debated. Some even go further and argue that the com-
plainant should be allowed to receive the total state
award plus all collateral sums, even if duplicative, with-
out any reduction or reimbursement, until he has a total
amount sufficient to "make him whole" for all his actual,
tort law damages, including those elements that could
not he recognized under the compensation act.
Under some of these approaches, problems could
arise in determining what the collateral payment is for,
what a claimant's total actual tort law damages are (the
board only determines economic loss), how to allocate
payments partially satisfying collateral awards among
the various elements, whether to deduct for "clear"
collateral rights even if they have not yet been pursued
and determined, how to ascertain if they are "clear,"
and whether and how to have state subrogation.
The state compensation award is inadequate: in many
cases because of the various limitations on damages.
The "make-him-whole" approach tends to compensate
the claimant for more of his total tort law losses without
the state expense of making them directly comnensable
under the act. The claimant receives the benefit of
premiums paid and remains willing to insure. This ap-
proach, however, requires perhaps an unnecessary
ascertainment of the claimant's total tort law losses.
And the determination may be required after the com-
pensation hearing is over, i.e., when the collateral source
pays. The state coffers also must forgo the benefit of
collateral recoveries unless and until the "make-him-
whole" point is reached.
Unlike the federal bill, the uniform act reiects the
"make him whole". approach. A middle ground is taken:
only collateral payments to the claimant on elements of
damage covered by a compensation award (economic
loss) are to be deducted or reimbursed, while others
(pain and suffering) are not. Rules are provided for
determining what various collateral payments represent.
Should Members of the Family Be Excluded?
When a claimant is a member of the offender's im-
mediate family or lives in his household, possibilities
arise of fraud, collusion, or that the offender may benefit
from the award either directly or by being relieved of
support. Indeed he may injure for gain, some argue.
Disqualifying from compensation persons having
these affinities to the offender or his accomolice seems
tempting. But the victim may be a wholly innocent
spouse or child of the offender, trapped by the relation-
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ship. Varying degrees of estrangement are possible. A
large proportion of all violent crime does, in fact, take
place within the family or household, so excluding these
crimes may defeat compensation when it is most needed.
Most acts do have a "relationship" exclusion usually
covering the immediate family living with the offender
and his household, Some accomplish this by excluding
certain persons, others by excluding certain crimes, e.g.,
crimes against members of the family or household.
The latter has the undesired side effect of cutting off
from compensation a nonhousehold, nonfamily bystand-
er who happens to be injured.
The intention of the exclusion is to avoid payment
to the offender's family who live with him and others
having a similar relationship. Some persons challenge
this aim. The only justifiable reason for the exclusion,
is to prevent fraud, collusion, or unfair benefit, they
argue. Cannot cases arise in which the prohibited rela-
tionship exists, but there is no fraud, collusion, or unfair
benefit, or the need to help the victim outweighs the
benefit? Safeguards can be designed. Fraud, collusion.,
and unfair benefit arise, in cases outside the exclusion, too.
If this is so, there should be no relationship exclusion.
All claims should be scrutinized for fraud, collusion, and
unfair gain to the offender. This is the approach taken
by the uniform act. Any claim may be disallowed or
reduced on grounds of "unjust benefit" to the offender
or his accomplice. "Unjust benefit" encompasses all the
concerns of the standard relationship exclusion, at least
when read in context with the remainder of the act,
which requires proof of a genuine claim.
The act includes an optional alternative that ex-
cludes the immediate family or those in the same house-
hold as the offender or his accomplice "unless the
interests of justice otherwise require in a particular
case." The philosophy is the same: the amount of risk
of unjust benefit and the strength of the circumstances
suggesting compensation, rather than the relationship
of the claimant, are determinative. The optional lan-
gauge, out of solicitude for problem-s of proof, assumes
that the risk justifies exclusion in the case of relation-
ship unless shown otherwise.
A common addition to the relationship exclusions-
"maintaining sexual relations with the offender"-is not
found in the act. Instead, those sexual relationships that
warrant an assumption of unjust benefit, including fraud
or collusion, would probably be encompassed by the
"unjust benefit" language or the: optional language ex-
cluding persons "living in the same household" or
excluding the "spouse." More transient sexual relation-
ships might disentitle under the general provision deal-
ing with "contributory misconduct."
What Is the Offender's Restitution Duty?
Should the offender be required as part of the penal
process to make partial or complete restitution to the state
for the award, either out of private means or through
some "work-it-off" program? Perhaps a special fine could
be added to any other penalty. In the federal bill all
criminal fines go into the criminal compensation fund,
but this is hardly a restitution measure. The uniform
act rejects the restitution approach because it risks
creating more social problems than it solves. How much
benefit anyone would actually receive is questionable.
Restitution could hinder rehabilitation by heaping on
the offender more obligations of the kind he could not
meet previously and which may have helped lead to
his criminal actions. Do we get anywhere by diverting
funds away from one social problem, the offender's
family, to another? While we could try to separate the
cases that are appropriate for restitution, the cost of the
necessary machinery and the restructuring of legal pro-
cedures does not seem worth the expected gains.
Should the Crimes Covered Be Specified?
Some acts list the particular crimes to: be covered,
and others state "any crime" or "any violent crime."
Of course, a personal injury arising from the crime must
always be shown.
The problem with listing crimes is the difficulty in
predicting every crime that might give rise to personal
injury. Some crimes that are ordinarily harmless to life
and limb and are not in their statutory nature violent
may be dangerous when committed under particular
circumstances. One example suffices: criminal fraud
consisting of a misrepresentation that an automobile
has been repaired.
Including "any crime" resulting in personal injury
may be too broad. A crime should be excluded if it is
both ordinarily nonviolent in nature and committed
under apparently nondangerous circumstances but
through a weird concatenation of circumstances results
in personal injury. For example, suppose a criminal
misrepresentation concerning stock values produces a
heart attack in an apparently normal individual. Of
course, deft handling of the proximate cause issue could
avoid this result, even under an "any crime" approach,
but much would depend on the administering board.
The language chosen for the uniform act, therefore,
defines the covered "criminally injurious conduct" as
"conduct posing a substantial threat of personal injury
or death" and "punishable by fine,, imprisonment or
death," occurring or attempted in the state. In accord
with most existing acts, motor vehicle offenses are
specifically excluded except when personal injury or
death is intended. The rationale is economic. These
injuries will normally fall within other existing or pro-
jected compensation mechanisms, especially the no-
fault scheme.
Should Compensation Be Limited to Crimes?
Several concepts in criminal and tort law are designed
to relieve persons of liability to the extent that they
were not at fault, for example, they did not have the
capacity to contemplate or foresee the harm. Should the
inflicter's fault be relevant when the inflicter may not
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be a party to the proceedings and will not as a result
of those proceedings be punished or required to part
with private funds? Wasn't the concept of fault designed
to limit the liability of the inflicter? Shouldn't the only
issues be the extent of the loss and the victim's inno-
cence?
But that argument goes too far. It suggests com-
pensation for any catastrophe that befalls an innocent
victim, something for which the public is not yet ready.
The uniform act, like many others, requires a crime
but not capacity, this being aimed principally at infancy
and insanity. Part of the definition of compensable
criminally injurious conduct is that it must be "punish-
able . . . [or would be] but for the fact that the person
... lacked capacity to commit the crime under the laws
of this state." This language avoids the ambiguity inher-
ent in similar language under other acts.
Will the Act Improve Law Enforcement?
Some law enforcement personnel fear that criminal
injuries reparations will divert funds from law enforce-
ment, especially under the pending federal bill in which
federal funding of state plans is to come through the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
While there is no real answer to this problem, it is
hoped that legislators will view these programs as ad-
ditional to law enforcement with no impact on the funds
appropriated for law enforcement. The two are directed
toward different parts of the social problem of crime.
Indeed, it is perhaps the failure of law enforcement that
produced the impetus for victim compensation, and it
would be ironic if that compensation resulted in less en-
forcemcnt.
The need to appease law enforcers, the need to justify
the use of the L.E.A.A., and plain good sense have
stimulated interest in ways in which criminal injuries
compensation can aid law enforcement and crime pre-
vention.
Some persons argue that victim compensation rein-
forces psychological barriers against crime by creating
strong social norms contributing to prevention. Society
will demonstrate the sincerity of its moral condemnation
by showing concern for the victim and treating the
injury as something of enormity.
Whatever the merits of this argument, several specific
provisions can help enforcement and prevention. They
also safeguard against fraudulent or undeserving claims.
The act, for example, requires that, in order for the
claimant to obtain compensation, the crime must be re-
ported to law enforcement officers "within seventy-two
hours unless the board finds there was good cause for
the failure to report in that time." Programs vary re-
specting the time period and the presence of the "unless"
clause.
A related requirement enables the board to take meas-
ures if the victim has not co-operated fully with police.
There may be convincing reasons, such as threats, for
not co-operating. It was deemed inadvisable to flag
these in specific statutory language and risk improper
inducement. The act merely provides, therefore, that the
board in its discretion may to any extent reduce, deny,
or reconsider the award for failure to co-operate with
law enforcement.
Another provision allows "contributory misconduct"
to influence an award. Some plans mandate complete
denial of award on a "contributory negligence" as op-
posed to a "comparative negligence" model. The uniform
act grants the board maximum discretion to decide what
is contributory misconduct and its effect. The discretion
is not unlimited, as there must be misconduct and it must
be contributory. Negligence, provocation, consent, the
duty to mitigate damages, and, possibly more debatable
moral notions, also will play a role.
A fourth provision may encourage "good Samaritans"
to help fellow citizens under criminal attack, or to help
prevent escape, or to help officers. An assumption is
made that the act can encourage and that encourage-
ment will lead to fewer rather than more injuries.
This provision allows these "helper citizens" or their
surviving families to claim reparations. But should they
be included if they are mistaken or even negligent when
they intervene? Should a request for assistance be re-
quired in the case of aiding officers? the, acts take
different viewpoints. The solution may depend on one's
assessment of how overcautious people are today, the
effectiveness of the police, and whether encouragement
will mean fewer or more injuries.
The uniform act provides: " 'Victim' means a person
who suffers personal injury or death as a result of . . .
(2) the good faith effort of any person to prevent
criminally injurious conduct, or (3) the good faith ef-
fort of any person to apprehend a person suspected of
engaging in criminally injurious conduct." (Emphasis
added.)
Why is a special provision needed? Aren't these
people included under the other provisions compensating
persons and their families injured as a result of crime?
The quoted special language provides that situations of
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suspected crime are also encompassed in the case of
helpers. These situations seem to have been overlooked
in other acts. Beyond this, specifying that voluntary in-
tervenors are not responsible for their own injury pre-
cludes a possible proximate cause or contributory con-
duct problem. Finally, it is best to address directly
those you hope to encourage.
The approach of the federal bill-to favor helpers and
their families by awarding them their property damage
in addition to their regular damage and to relieve them
of the "financial stress" test-was rejected in the uni-
form act on the same rationale that led to rejection of
these approaches for ordinary claimants, and because
it is doubtful that any encouragement would ensue.
Publicizing the Act
Widespread citizen ignorance of the availability of
existing acts is a problem. A legislative tendency not to
publicize a costly program, a legislative insensitivity to
the proportions of the problem, and a limited budget for
awards may be responsible. The uniform act obligates
the board to publicize it. While particular measures are
not specified, possibilities could include postings in emer-
gency rooms and public transport, educating medical per-
sonnel, spot media announcements, and a "Miranda"
type of notification by police to victims of their re-
parations rights.
Disparities between the Federal and Uniform Acts
Pending federal financing has triggered enormous
interest in criminal injuries compensation programs. The
federal bill would provide 75 per cent of the funds for a
state plan that conforms to federal standards. The federal
standards, while being left to future administrative de-
termination, will require some conformity to the federal
bill's proposed compensation program for federal local-
ities. There is at least one glaring difference between
that program and the recommended version of the uni-
form act. The latter omits a financial ability test. There
are other differences as well. Won't states, to be safe,
merely wait and carbon copy the federal compensation
program, leaving no room for a competing uniform act?
Some considerations influenced the uniform act's
drafters to proceed nonetheless. These are: (1) The
federal bill may not yet be in final form. A uniform act
could influence its shape. (2) Total conformity will
not be required for federal financing. (3) Even sub-
stantial nonconformity will not totally defeat federal
financing. As the federal bill now stands, certain con-
forming expenditures will be federally financed despite
the complex accounting this entails. (4) The federal bill
may be delayed or never enacted, although this seems
unlikely. (5) State acts can be changed if and when fed-
eral financing becomes a reality. (6) A state may choose
to engage in an activity even though it may be outside
the ambit of federal financing.
Current interest in compensating innocent victims
and their families injured by crimes marks a step for-
ward in modern Anglo-American law that will pay
dividends to society. The uniform act is an attempt to
put tog ther and articulate in an improved fashion what
has been learned from existing acts and their adminis-
tration in a way that can be given serious consideration
by all the states and by the federal government. A
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1975 ROSS ESSAY CONTEST
The following information is furnished for contestants in the 1975 Ross Essay
Contest, which is conducted by the American Bar Association pursuant to the terms
of the bequest of Judge Erskine M. Ross.
Time for Submission: On or before April 1, 1975.
Amount of Prize: $5,000.
Subject: "Property Rights and First Amendment Rights-Balance and Conflict."
Eligibility: The contest will be open to all members of the Association in good
standing, including new members elected prior to March 1, 1975 (except previous
winners, members of the Board of Governors, officers and employees of the Associa-
tion), who have paid their annual dues to the Association for the fiscal year in which
the essay is to be submitted,
Essay Requirements: No essay will be accepted unless prepared for this contest
and not previously published. Each entrant will be required to assign to the Associa-
tion all right, title, and interest in the essay submitted. It is the policy of the Associa-
tion to return all but the winning manuscript after the judges have made their decision
and to release the assignment of rights.
Instructions: All necessary instructions and complete information with respect to
the number of words, number of copies, footnotes, citations, and means of identifica-
tion may be secured on request to the Ross Essay Contest, American Bar Association,
1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
